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The Reasonable Republic? Statecraft, Affects, 
and the Highest Good in Spinoza’s Late 
Tractatus Politicus 
 
Abstract: In his final, incomplete Tractatus Politicus (1677), Spinoza’s account of 
human power and freedom shifts towards a new, teleological interest in the ‘highest 
good’ of the state in realising the freedom of its subjects. This development reflects, 
in part, the growing influence of Aristotle, Machiavelli, Dutch republicanism, and the 
Dutch post-Rampjaar context after 1672, with significant implications for his view 
of political power and freedom. It also reflects an expansion of his account of natural 
right to include independence of mind, a model of autonomy that in turn shapes the 
infamous sui juris exclusions of his unfinished account of democracy. This article 
focuses specifically on the Tractatus Politicus, a hitherto under-addressed work in 
Spinoza’s corpus and one too often considered indistinct from his earlier Tractatus 
Theologico-Politicus (1670). It argues for a reconsideration of its importance to early 
modern political thought, particularly regarding the role of the state in realising the 
freedom and harmony of its subjects through reasonable laws.  
Keywords: Spinoza, natural right, sovereignty, teleology, democracy, collective 
power 
 
That the Tractatus Politicus (Political Treatise, 1677) begins with the word ‘Affectus’, 
and ends with the expulsion of women from an idealised democracy, makes it 
something of an anomaly within the thought of Benedict de Spinoza. While there has 
been a recent flourishing of interest in Spinoza’s politics, it has tended to share in an 
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enthusiastic image of the thinker as a radical, untimely figure. ‘The true visionary is 
Spinoza in the garb of a Neapolitan revolutionary’, write Deleuze and Guattari, while 
others have traced and hailed his contributions to a radical Enlightenment or late 20th 
century modernity.1 Yet behind this visionary Spinoza is a more nuanced and 
ambivalent political theorist, one whose thought develops and transforms in his final 
years between the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (Theological-Political Treatise, 
1670; hereafter TTP) and unfinished Tractatus Politicus (hereafter TP) in a way that 
is instructive, and under-assessed, for understanding his political thought.2 As an 
incomplete work one must be cautious in inferring what may have been ultimately 
revised or abandoned, but, in itself, it presents arguments about political power 
logically derived from the Ethics and TTP while exploring new directions. One can 
highlight the foundational role of the affects in politics, the heightened role of the state 
in human flourishing, a greater emphasis on the singularity of social coordination and 
association ‘led as if by one mind’, and in a peculiar application of teleological 
 
1 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. 
Lane (London: Continuum, 2004), 29; Jonathan Israel, Radical Enlightenment (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001); Michael Mack, Spinoza and the Specters of Modernity (London: Continuum, 
2010). 
2 Standard referencing used with Spinoza’s works: E = Ethics; Ep = Letters (Epistolae); KV = Short 
Treatise on God, Man and his Well-being (Korte Verhandeling van God, de Mensch en des zelfs 
Welstand); TIE = Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect (Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione); 
TP = Political Treatise; TTP = Theological-Political Treatise. References to TTP and TP indicate 
chapter number followed by section e.g. TTP 20.6 is Chapter 20, section 6. References to Ethics 
follow standard format: app = appendix; df = definition; p = proposition; pref = preface; s = scholium. 
E.g. E4p37s2 refers to Ethics Part 4, proposition 37, second scholium. Editions used: Benedictus de 
Spinoza, Spinoza Opera, ed. Carl Gebhardt, 4 vols. (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1925); The Collected 
Works of Spinoza: Vols I-II, ed. trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985, 
2016). 
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principles in politics that reflects a re-engagement with Aristotle, necessitated by a 
changing political context and reflections on his theory of the imagination. 
The argument is structured as follows: Part 1 assesses current scholarship on the 
TP, and Part 2 explores its historical-political context. Part 3 analyses the influence of 
Aristotle in its teleological identification of the ‘highest good’ and optimal form of the 
state in realising freedom, and Part 4 contrasts it with Machiavelli’s influence. Part 5 
assesses Spinoza’s new formulation of collective power or ‘union of minds’ with the 
enhanced role of the state in making reasonable and free citizens of the multitude. The 
conclusion challenges whether Spinoza sufficiently incorporated individual self-
determination into the models of free and reasonable republics. 
1. Context 
The TP has long been overlooked by scholars of Spinoza’s politics and ethics.3 Where 
discussed, accounts tend to focus on three features: 1) its relationship to Spinoza’s 
previous works, and whether it marks an evolution or merely reiteration of earlier 
ideas; 2) its incomplete account of democracy and relegation of women from 
citizenship on naturalistic grounds; and 3) the relationship of the multitude to the 
constitution of the state, upon which Spinoza rests its peace and security. The TP’s 
obscurity is not helped by a common view that the late work marks, in Lee Rice and 
Steven Barbone’s words, ‘no real doctrinal shift’ from the better-known TTP, just a 
‘change in language and formulation’.4 We find more sympathetic praise among its 
 
3 This is no new phenomenon: the TP was rarely translated until the 19th century, and Bayle, Diderot 
and D’Alembert’s encyclopaedia entries on Spinozism, decisive to the dissemination of Spinoza’s 
ideas over the 18th century, make no mention of it. Nor does it feature at all in the early biographies by 
Lucas and Colerus. 
4 As Steven Barbone and Lee Rice argue in their perceptive introduction to Spinoza, Political 
Treatise, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000), 20. 
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translators – Curley, as deserving ‘careful attention’ and furnishing ‘the materials for 
a much deeper understanding of Spinoza’s political philosophy’, and Moreau as the 
most ‘autonomous’ expression of his political ideas, unfettered of Cartesianism, or 
natural law and Hobbesian right.5 But in both cases, the engagement with the TP comes 
much later in their careers which have been otherwise established through research on 
the Ethics. Not dissimilarly, a recent collection of essays on the TP, edited by Yitzhak 
Melamed and Hasana Sharp, presents the work as Spinoza’s ‘neglected masterpiece’.6 
Yet many essays therein give as much (if not more) space to discussing Spinoza’s 
earlier works, with the TP serving to illuminate his earlier, more important 
formulations. It is unclear from these works there would be any interest in studying 
the ideas of the TP if its author were unknown, and all that remained were its place 
and date of publication. 
This is to grapple with the problem of a thinker’s intellectual development, a 
question of ‘evolution’ that has been explored comprehensively by Alexandre 
Matheron in the relation of the TTP and TP. For Matheron, a decisive rupture occurs 
between the two through Spinoza’s late theory of the imitative affects in Ethics, 
resulting in a shifting view of the political that is no longer contractualist and static, 
but ‘dynamic’, governed by the interplay of affective forces through which society is 
engendered.7 Reciprocal affective cycles of compassion and revenge form the basis 
 
5 Curley, Collected Works II, 491; Moreau in Melamed and Sharp (eds.), “Introduction”, in Spinoza’s 
Political Treatise: A Critical Guide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 1. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Alexandre Matheron, "Le probleme de l'evolution de Spinoza du Traite theologico-politique au 
Traite politique", in Études sur Spinoza et les philosophies et l’âge classique (Lyon: ENS, 2011), 205; 
the analysis expands on his earlier Individu et communauté chez Spinoza (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 
1969), 328-29. 
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for our social relations.8 In a genealogical account that ventures way beyond Spinoza, 
Matheron envisions the state’s emergence out of a struggle of pity or glory, 
degenerating into domination or envy, from which an afflicted party becomes 
indignant, and gathers the power of the multitude to defend them, through which a new 
political order is constituted.9 Yet indignation for Spinoza is necessarily evil, and there 
is little either in the TP or Ethics that sustains such a heavy weighting on the imitative 
affects. While the affects and sociability are fundamental features of Spinoza’s late 
politics, Matheron’s effort to dismiss Hobbesian contractualism in Spinoza’s politics10 
leaves him with a politics of human unsociability at odds with what I suggest is the 
TP’s more Aristotelian framework. One which places the state’s genesis in the 
sociality and common affects of the multitude, and a statecraft guided by reason, 
prescribing laws and institutions of government that engender common flourishing.  
As others have also observed, the emphasis on the social contract is also 
relegated, resting on the scarce mention given to contractus, and no mention of pactum 
(though Hobbes rarely used either term).11 Rosenthal claims there is instead a more 
dynamic investment of power through direct ‘participation in public life’, a view 
indebted to Matheron.12 Curley debates whether this abandonment of the social 
contract in the late Spinoza is correct.13 In any case, Spinoza does refer to the social 
 
8 Matheron, “Le probleme de l’evolution”, 211. 
9 Ibid., 212-13, relying tenuously on TP 6.1. 
10 Matheron, Individu, 295-6 
11 Others who claim Spinoza rejects contractarianism include Antonio Negri, Savage Anomaly, trans. 
Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003, 30; Balibar, Spinoza and Politics, 
trans. Peter Snowdon (London: Verso, 2008), 50; Michael A. Rosenthal, “Spinoza’s Political 
Philosophy”, in The Oxford Handbook of Spinoza, ed. Michael Della Rocca (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017), 409; and Barbone and Rice’s introduction to Spinoza, Political Treatise, 12 
12 Rosenthal, “Spinoza’s Political Philosophy”, 410; Matheron, Individu, 37-38. 
13 Curley, Collected Works II, 491. 
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contract in TP 4.6, and writes of a transfer of power elsewhere,14 and Matheron 
understates the constitutive and binding nature of this later rendition of the contract, 
which is not merely procedural or legal as he suggests.15 Given Spinoza's own critical 
remarks in the TTP (16.6) about the social contract being only as useful as the utility 
of obeying it, we should question whether Spinoza was ever a sincere contractarian in 
the first place. Nonetheless, the nature of the contract changes: the peace and power of 
a state reflects laws and decisions that realise, rather than coerce or govern, the 
‘common feeling’ of the multitude, and the nature of this common feeling is the subject 
of Part 5.  
A second feature of TP scholarship is its exclusion of women (alongside 
servants, children and foreigners) from its theoretical form of democracy, left 
incomplete on his death. As Balibar memorably writes, here ‘we watch him die before 
this blank page’, as his earlier anthropology of human power as socio-circumstantial 
clashes with the uncritical reiteration of prevailing patriarchal norms. It results in what 
Steinberg calls a ‘rigid and untenable essentialism’, echoing earlier claims by 
Genevieve Lloyd, Moira Gatens and others.16 Undoubtedly, these questions are part of 
a broader reassessment of sexism in the history of philosophy of great importance. Yet 
 
14 E.g. TP 3.3, 6.5, 7.5, and 8.2. 
15 Matheron, “Le probleme de l'evolution”, 206-08. 
16 TP 11.4; Balibar, Masses, Classes, Ideas, trans. James Swenson (London; New York: Routledge, 
1994), 26; Steinberg, Spinoza’s Political Psychology: The Taming of Fortune and Fear (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2018), 166. Feminist critiques of Spinoza’s reasoning tend to pitch 
Ethics’ anthropology of power against the TP. See, inter alia, Lloyd, Part of Nature (Ithaca: Cornell, 
1994), ch5; Gatens, Imaginary Bodies (London: Routledge, 1996), 134; James, “Democracy and the 
Good Life in Spinoza’s Philosophy”, in Interpreting Spinoza: Critical Essays, ed. Charles Huenemann 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 146; Lord, “‘Disempowered by Nature’: Spinoza on 
the Political Capabilities of Women”, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 19.6 (2011), 
1087.  
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while Spinoza’s uncritical appeal to nature should here (and elsewhere) be challenged, 
such views on women’s franchise are the norm in classic and contemporary Dutch 
republicanism, from Aristotle and Cicero to Machiavelli, the De la Courts, and, in 
England, among radicals like the Levellers. We ought to engage with hermeneutic 
charity when challenging Spinoza with perspectives or ideas he could not have 
entertained. A discussion on the TP’s historical context, intellectual sources or textual 
composition is decisive to understanding why Spinoza returns to political matters (and 
changes his ideas on certain foundational matters of the TTP, like the nature of 
democracy, independence of mind, human association, and the social contract) at the 
end of his life.  
The same must apply to Spinoza’s extensive reconsideration of the powers and 
purpose of the state, explored in Part 5. Steinberg’s landmark 2018 analysis of 
Spinoza’s politics returns the TP’s account of the state back to the fore. Its underlining 
argument is that, in Spinoza, the ‘aim of politics is continuous with the aim of ethics’, 
and that the ‘fundamental purpose of the state is to reconstitute essences or reorient 
ingenia [the mentality of its subjects] so as to promote liberty, power, and hope’.17 Yet 
the analysis’s focus on drawing commonalities excludes innovations in the TP like its 
concern with state’s highest good, its focus not on individual but collective right, and 
its understanding of the political as inherently conflictual.18 These all bear the imprint 
of an engagement with the politics of Aristotle and Machiavelli which cannot be 
discerned in the earlier TTP, as well as changing political contexts. The paper will now 
make the case for this context and influences over the next three parts, before exploring 
 
17 Steinberg, Spinoza’s Political Psychology, 37. 
18 This view of the political as inherently conflictual in Spinoza, and its basis in Machiavelli, is 
outlined in Filippo Del Lucchese, Conflict, Power, and Multitude in Machiavelli and Spinoza 
(London: Continuum, 2009), 29-32. 
8 
 
the theoretical dimensions of this late political turn to the highest good, popular 
sovereignty and its relation to statecraft. 
2. Rampjaar 
The period between the TTP’s publication in 1670 and Spinoza’s untimely death in 
February 1677 (with the publication of the TP in the Opera Posthuma later that year), 
has been subject to many good historical analyses.19 Nonetheless, certain events over 
these years are decisive to the TP’s production, motivations and aims. Following the 
subterfuges in publishing the TTP anonymously, Spinoza initially avoided 
identification as its author, and returned to the Ethics, upon which work was delayed 
the previous five years.20 A report suggests he was still anxious for his safety, as well 
as for the reputation of the TTP. In February 1671 he writes to his friend Jarig Jelles, 
asking him to do everything he could to prevent the circulation of a Dutch translation 
of the work, fearing it would become banned and jeopardise his safety.21 In the same 
letter, he speculates about the need for a new political work that would treat the 
‘highest good’ of the state, beyond the empty pursuit of ‘wealth and honours’, but his 
later preoccupation with completing the Ethics postpones this plan, like many other of 
Spinoza’s great, unfinished projects. It would be through the hostile reaction to the 
 
19 On the historical context of the TTP, see Israel, Radical Enlightenment, ch. 16; M.J. Petry, ‘Hobbes 
and the Early Dutch Spinozists,” in Spinoza's Political and Theological Thought, ed. C. De Deugd 
(Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 1984), 150-170; Noel Malcolm, Aspects of Hobbes (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 44-52, and Susan James, Spinoza on Philosophy, Religion and 
Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), ch. 1. 
20 Cf. Ep 30 to Oldenburg. 
21 Ep 44 to Jelles (17th February 1671). There is a strong argument by Duijkerius, reproduced by 
Curley in Collected Works II, 390 n30, that J.H. Glazemaker was the translator, and that Jelles 
subsidised the translation, hence Spinoza’s entreaty. Glazemaker was a friend of Spinoza and an 
accomplished translator in his own right, and author of the first Dutch translation of the TTP, 
belatedly published in 1693. 
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TTP, and the collapse of the Dutch republic’s liberal government in 1672, that 
compelled a return to politics.  
The republican government under Grand Pensionary Johan de Witt had been 
surrounded by rivals since the 1650s. Despite their shared Protestantism, conflict had 
broken out with England over maritime trading supremacy, resulting in the First and 
Second Anglo-Dutch wars of 1652-54 and 1665-67, through which the Dutch United 
Provinces emerged damaged but victorious.22 A year later, an unlikely Triple Alliance 
was formed between England, the United Provinces and Sweden to support the defence 
of the Spanish Netherlands against invasion by France. Resentful of defeat, jealous of 
Dutch wealth and seeking to boost the royal coffers, Charles II of England concluded 
the secret Treaty of Dover with Louis XIV of France in June 1670 to attack the 
unsuspecting Dutch. Two years later, a major coordinated attack by France, England, 
Munster and Cologne overran its borders and overwhelmed its forces. The year 1672 
would be called Rampjaar or ‘Disaster year’.  
Though no prescription of the TTP could have aided the Dutch against such 
odds, they might have saved de Witt and his supporters who, in the ensuing military 
collapse, were purged from power by the supporters of Prince William III of Orange, 
who re-assumed the title of stadhouder, left unoccupied for two decades. For while the 
Dutch were militarily able to conduct an effective defence by land and sea, the invasion 
produced a political crisis of legitimacy that led to the collapse of the state’s liberal, 
republican regents, amid a war many accused the government of not being sufficiently 
 
22 For more on the Dutch context, see J.L. Price, Dutch Society: 1588-1713 (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2014), chapter 5; Maarten Prak, The Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century, trans. Diane Webb 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 50-52; and Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic: 
Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477-1806 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), chapter 31.  
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vigilant and prepared. Its downfall had been accelerated by an uneven division of 
power between the pro-Orangist and Calvinist Dutch Reformed Church, which 
enjoyed significant public support, and the mercantile, liberal States faction which 
made up De Witt’s government and supporters, to whom the TTP had appealed. 
Spinoza’s appeal for democracy and toleration had been ignored by the many, who 
now embraced draconian religious controls and the slow restoration of monarchy. But 
for Spinoza, the momentary triumph of the ultimi barbarorum in the deaths of the De 
Witts could not be put down to the moral failures of any group of people, but the 
inadequate constitution of the state. 
Worse, the TTP had become a succès de scandale, with authorities rushing to 
raid bookshops and ban the work shortly after its sale, and Spinoza was openly 
identified as its author by 1671-2.23 Spinoza had lost one friend to political repression 
(Adriaan Koerbagh, who had died in jail in 1669), and between the murder of De Witt 
in 1672 and the execution of his friend and teacher, Franciscus Van den Enden, for 
treason in France in 1674, Spinoza had sufficient grounds to question his safety. His 
correspondence indicates an increased suspicion of the motives of others, be it the offer 
of the chair of Philosophy at Heidelberg University in March 1673, or, in 1675, 
Leibniz’s request for a privately-circulating manuscript of the Ethics.24 Both are 
refused. Spinoza’s world had become a more dangerous place since the TTP. 
 
23 Though there was no formal ban against the work by the States of Holland until June 1674, 
circulation was suppressed from the outset. See Jonathan Israel, “The Early Dutch and German 
Reaction to the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus: Foreshadowing the Enlightenment’s More General 
Spinoza Reception?” in Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise: A Critical Guide, ed. Yitzhak Y. 
Melamed and Michael A. Rosenthal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010): 76-85. 
24 See Ep 48 to J. Louis Fabritius (30th March 1673); and Ep 72 to G.H. Schuller (18th November 
1675). 
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His personal safety was also in danger. In late July 1675 Spinoza visited 
Amsterdam to oversee the publication of the Ethics, begun around thirteen years 
earlier, but after being warned of a danger to his life should the book be published, he 
postpones it, fearing its suppression and his arrest.25 In a letter of September that year, 
alongside revealing his reasons for delaying publication, he reports that his intention 
to clarify the more controversial passages of the TTP ‘and remove the prejudices 
conceived about it’, with a series of annotations.26 The enterprise was incomplete by 
the time of his death in February 1677,27 and it is more likely that in his final years, 
and after completing the Ethics, Spinoza placed his efforts in a new wholly political 
work, like that suggested to Jelles four years earlier.  
Spinoza’s final known letter to an unnamed friend, likely Jelles, written around 
the summer of 1676, informs him of work completed on the TP, begun ‘some time 
ago, on your recommendation’.28 He had completed six chapters so far, and stated his 
intention to treat the ‘ultimate thing a state can aim at’ in a new political work. It is a 
peculiarly teleological object, presented in the TP’s title-page as the inviolability of a 
state and its citizens, its peace and security.29 Unlike the TTP and Ethics, the work is 
written in a freer style, neither deploying rhetorical and hermeneutic devices involving 
scripture, nor in geometric order. It openly acknowledges arguments in the previous 
two works, something unprecedented in Spinoza’s writing, given concerns over 
anonymity, safety and censorship. It suggests that its audience were the circle of 
 
25 Ep 68 to Henry Oldenburg (September 1675). 
26 Ibid.; cf. Ep 69 to Lambert van Velthuysen (Autumn 1675), which also requests in writing his 
criticisms of the TTP. 
27 A total of 39 exist, though most seem to have been produced by later translators, with only five 
agreed on as close to authoritative. See Curley, Collected Works II, 60. 
28 Ep 84, undated. 
29 TP title-page. 
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trusted friends who had studied copies of the Ethics in circulation, and had commented 
upon the TTP. This new political work emerges out of conversations like those leading 
to the friend’s suggestion to set Spinoza’s political ideas onto the page, revised for a 
more unstable milieu. Spinoza’s late politics would be rooted in a foundation of the 
political in the affects, mirroring their expanding role for human freedom in the later 
Ethics, and in the ability of a state’s organisation (and not individual leadership) to 
instil and enhance the ‘justice and loving-kindness’ of its subjects, foundational to 
‘true religion’ in the TTP, and now essential to a state’s security.30  
3. The Highest Good  
The changing context is alone insufficient to grasp the TP’s specificity, which marks 
the use of new (or at least, previously little used) theoretical materials. It commences 
with natural right, and from there to sovereign power, before moving onto the classic 
trio of political models: monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy (populare imperium), 
a cyclical, tripartite model that contemporaries would immediately associate with 
classic proponent, Aristotle. In seeking to address both the highest end of the political 
community, as well as its three manifestations, Spinoza was drawing on a tradition in 
political theory through Aquinas, Machiavelli, Grotius, and Hobbes of using 
Aristotle’s Politics as a theoretical base from which to think through and beyond. The 
Politics combined teleological optimism with scientific naturalism to describe the civil 
state (polis) as the highest aim and ‘most sovereign of all goods’ towards which human 
 
30 Numerous commentators have observed the expansion of the affects in Spinoza’s late philosophy, 
compared to TIE and KV. It is possible that through work on the TTP, Spinoza became aware of the 
affective and imaginative nature of the political, compelling an expansion of what had been one 
chapter-treatment of the affects into Parts 3 and 4 of Ethics, separating human servitude to the affects 
from our freedom or power over them. The TTP repeatedly pairs ‘justice and loving-kindness’ as the 
social goods taught by true religion, e.g. pref.26, Ch. 14, 19.6-9. 
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associations look.31 Aristotle considered the human as a distinctly ‘political animal’, 
able through speech to indicate what is useful, just and good, and naturally driven to 
seek ‘the good life’ made possible through the state.32 Political organisation was 
understood as the highest ideal of human achievement, yet a true understanding of 
politics must begin, for Aristotle and Spinoza, in the elementary nature of human 
sociality and association. 
Determining the extent of influence in Spinoza’s work is always difficult, given 
his reluctance to openly refer to or engage in open dialogic critique of other positions. 
Spinoza’s sparse references to Aristotle tend to be critical (‘[t]o me the authority of 
Plato, Aristotle and Socrates is not worth much’, he writes to Hugo Boxel),33 though 
this tends to be more directed at the Scholastics, and a small number of commentators 
have observed patterns of influence, from Freudenthal and Wolfson to Vardoulakis 
and Sharp most recently.34 Manzini’s 2009 magisterial study of Spinoza’s 
Aristotelianism rests on the evidence that Spinoza possessed a 1548 copy of Aristotle’s 
Opera Omnia, a work with a peculiar misprint responsible for an inaccurate citation 
 
31 Aristotle, Politics, trans. T.A. Sinclair (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981), 1252a1.  
32 1252b27. 
33 Ep 56 (October/November 1674). 
34 The study of Spinoza’s intellectual development dates to ground-breaking works by Freudenthal 
and Wolfson; more recently, Yitzhak Melamed’s edited The Young Spinoza (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2015) contains numerous essays that challenge the idea that Spinoza’s thought 
remained static and fully-formed over his life. On Spinoza/Aristotle, see Jacob Freudenthal, 
“Spinozastudien”, in Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 108: 238-282 [1896]; 109: 
1-25 [1897]; Harry Austryn Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza, vol. 2 (New York: Schocken Books, 
1969), 47-48; Dimitris Vardoulakis, “Equality and Power: Spinoza’s Reformulation of the Aristotelian 
Tradition of Egalitarianism”, in A. Kiarina Kordela and Vardoulakis (eds.), Spinoza’s Authority: 
Resistance and Power in Ethics (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), 11-31; Hasana Sharp, “Family Quarrels 
and Mental Harmony: Spinoza’s Oikos-Polis Analogy”, in Melamed and Sharp (eds.), Spinoza’s 
Political Treatise, 93-110. 
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of the Metaphysics given in his early Cogitata Metaphysica (2.6), and which appears 
later in an inventory of his library after his death.35 References to man as a ‘social 
animal’ abound, and Aristotle is Spinoza’s second-most cited philosopher after 
Descartes. Manzini uses the CM to argue for a lifelong engagement with Aristotle in 
Spinoza, jeopardising our hypothesis about the Politics and TP. While traces of 
Aristotle are visible in his metaphysics and ethics,36 the TTP demonstrates little of an 
inherently Aristotelian view of human sociality, the three fixed constitutional forms, 
discussion of a ‘highest good’ in politics, or a theory of collective power, in contrast 
to their predominance in the TP. Nor are these merely matters of audience or context. 
Whereas Chapter 16 of the TTP would rest its political naturalism on a Hobbesian 
‘natural state’ based largely on conflict, mutual fear and self-interest, the TP takes as 
foundational that the good of the state is realised in the collective feeling, thinking and 
activity of citizens, guided into a life in common by a state founded on a constitution 
and laws in accordance with the dictates of reason.37  
There are several compelling reasons to consider Aristotle’s Politics as an 
important interlocutor in the development of the TP. First, as discussed, both share the 
 
35 Frédéric Manzini, Spinoza: une lecture d’Aristote (Paris, PUF, 2009), Introduction. References are 
to chapter, section and sub-section number in an electronic edition. On Spinoza’s library, which 
contained works by Machiavelli and the De la Courts, see Henri Krop, “Spinoza’s Library: The 
Mathematical and Scientific Works”, Intellectual History Review, 23.1 (March 2013), 27-30. 
36 Some pose whether there is something teleological in the conatus doctrine of Ethics (E3p6-p9). 
Jonathan Bennett uses a push/pull analogy: while the conatus as an efficient cause would involve a 
pushing motion (striving as its nature), there is in fact a pulling final cause: striving purposively to 
what will aid one’s preservation (A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1984), §50). But 
this issue can be remedied by considering desire, as humanity’s consciousness of the conatus, as 
something necessarily drawing on affective and imaginative ideas like ends and purposes, which are 
not necessarily veridical. Spinoza explicitly discourages finalism here (e.g. E1app), whereas the TP 
actively encourages it, marking a sea-change in its use of Aristotle.  
37 Compare TTP 16.1-3 with TP 2.21, 4.4; cf. E4p35.  
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view that the political is founded in human nature, specifically human sociality and the 
affects.38 Aristotle presents the state as the highest of all human associations, one 
whose sovereignty is constituted by the participation and support of the majority.39 He 
also argues that, where social unrest or law-breaking occurs, it is not the common 
people themselves at fault but the weak constitution of the state which gives rise to 
disturbances.40 Moreover, Aristotle’s teleological reasoning explores the complex 
nature of the political through optimal models of various political forms which arise, 
and are suited, to the contingent socio-cultural circumstances and traditions of different 
communities. Aristotle considered that ‘all possible forms of [political] organisation 
have now been discovered’,41 a point parroted in TP 1.3, and could be summarised as 
either monarchy, aristocracy, or ‘polity’ – defined as ‘[p]olitical control exercised by 
the mass of the populace in the common interest’.42 Unlike a democracy, disparaged 
as rule by the poor alone, the benefit of a polity is in enabling the highest possible 
number ‘to reach a high standard in all forms of virtue’. Its social institutions are 
sufficiently balanced to enable the majority to achieve the conditions of virtue that best 
provide for the ‘common good’.43 Polity therefore enables eudaimonia on a collective 
scale, impressing the common shared interest into the heart of decision-making, while 
additionally facilitating, by way of large deliberative assemblies, that a plurality of 
 
38 TP 1.1, 1.4; Politics, 1252b27-1253a7. 
39 1264b15, 1278b6, 1296b16, 1309b16 – compare TP 2.15-17. 
40 E.g. 1308b32, and across Book V. Echoed in Niccolò Machiavelli later, Discourses on Livy, trans. 
Julia Conaway Bondanella and Peter Bondanella (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), III.23, 
and TP 5.2. 
41 1264a1. 
42 1279a32. It is also notable that Spinoza does not endorse a ‘mixed government’ of the three as per 
Aristotle, Cicero and later Locke, though places a common principle of popular sovereignty in each. 
43 1278b6-1279a16. 
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views is represented and evaluated.44 ‘[F]or this reason’, Aristotle remarks, critically 
of monarchy, ‘in many cases a crowd judges better than any single person’.45 Such a 
polity has its foundations in reason, and can be discerned like any other natural 
phenomena.  
The polity is also a koinonia – a ‘community’ or ‘association’ defined by its 
common purpose.46 Spinoza’s earlier scepticism about free will in the Ethics plays out 
in the foundation of the state not in a common purpose but through shared affects – ‘a 
common hope, or fear, or a common desire to avenge some harm’.47 It is worth noting 
here that, contra Manzini, Spinoza may have imbibed his Aristotelian politics via 
intermediaries, in particular the Dutch Neo-Aristotelians at Leiden, where Spinoza is 
thought to have briefly studied, like Franco Burgersdijk, whose textbooks on logic, 
moral philosophy and politics had a lasting influence on Dutch academic learning from 
the 1640s, or his pupils Adriaan Heerebord and Marcus Zuerius van Boxhorn. 
Boxhorn’s Institutiones Politicae (1657) begins with a discussion of the origin and 
goal of political society, and then moves to the three classical forms of government – 
much like Spinoza, though typical of the genre. Boxhorn would produce an influential 
edition of Tacitus in 1643, an important source for the TTP, and Boxhorn’s teachings 
would influence Johan and Pieter de la Court, whose popular republican tracts of the 
1660s-70s also influence the TP. Yet Boxhorn and the De la Courts both emphasise 
humanity’s self-interested individualism in nature, echoing Hobbes and even the 
Spinoza of the TTP,48 which placed far more emphasis on contract than social, 
 
44 1281a44-b1; cf. TP 6.20. 
45 1286a31-32; cf. Manzini, Spinoza, 1.5.2.  
46 E.g. 1280b29. 
47 TP 6.1. 
48 TTP 16.6-9. 
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whereas the TP gestures towards a politics not just of sociality (like Burgersdijk or 
Grotius), but collective power.49 
4. Men as they are 
While the TP remains preoccupied with identifying this highest good in political 
societies, the first chapter also bears the influence of Machiavelli. Often ungenerous 
with his praise, Spinoza unusually refers to him favourably twice, and there are indirect 
allusions to his ideas throughout the TP. Important studies by Del Lucchese and 
Vittorio Morfino have addressed conceptual overlaps in both, while translators of the 
TP often highlight numerous parallels.50 Like Aristotle, consideration should be given 
to Dutch intermediaries: Machiavelli is prominently denounced in Burgersdijck, 
obliquely introducing his ideas to a generation of Dutch students.51 Some of the more 
obviously Machiavellian ideas of the TP appeared in earlier works by Johan and Pieter 
De la Court, for instance criticising mercenaries,52 and the rationality of large 
assemblies over small councils.53 Other significant overlaps between Machiavelli and 
 
49 For deeper historical work on this context, see Arthur Weststeijn, Commercial Republicanism in the 
Dutch Golden Age: The Political Thought of Johan & Pieter de la Court (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 26-35, 
and Hans Blom, Causality and Morality in Politics: The Rise of Naturalism in Dutch Seventeenth-
Century Political Thought (Utrecht: University of Utrecht, 1995), 89-100, and 175-177. 
50 For a systematic comparison on both, highlighting a common view of the political as inherently 
conflictual (a view shared by Hobbes) and their emphasis on the popular sovereignty of the multitude, 
see Del Lucchese, Conflict. Pace Morfino, it is Tacitus, not Machiavelli, that shapes the realism of the 
TTP; the TP by contrast clearly reproduces or expands explicitly on Machiavelli’s work (Morfino, 
“Memory, Chance and Conflict: Machiavelli in the Theological-Political Treatise”, in Spinoza’s 
Authority: Resistance and Power in the Political Treatises, ed. A. Kiarina Kordela and Dimitris 
Vardoulakis (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), 7-26. 
51 Weststeijn, Commercial Republicanism, 35 
52 TP 7.17, 8.9, echoing Machiavelli, Discourses III.24, in the De la Courts, Politike Discoursen, 
I.III.18 – cf. Weststeijn, Commercial Republicanism, 164. 
53 TP 8.3-4, echoing Discourses, I.58, and in the De la Courts’ Politike Weeg-Schaal II.I.3 – cf. 
Weststeijn, Commercial Republicanism, 265-266. 
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Spinoza include how military leaders often become tyrants;54 and on the critique of 
dictators and military law in Roman times.55 A lack of such Machiavellian motifs in 
the earlier TTP either suggests Spinoza’s thinking was still under the thrall of Hobbes 
or, more likely, that the turn to Machiavelli (and Aristotle) were conceptually and 
formally necessary, arising from a two-pronged aim to outline a politics commensurate 
with the affects and human nature, while also attuned to the highest good and optimal 
features of different forms of government. 
While also a naturalist, Machiavelli’s view of human nature is more pessimistic 
(‘all men are evil’),56 and his faith in wisely-organised political institutions is of a 
paternalistic sort, saving both princes and peoples from their worst impulses.57 The 
result is somewhat contradictory: while attuned to the best that an ideal society might 
achieve, Spinoza echoes Machiavelli in denouncing other philosophers whose politics 
have been based on ‘a human nature which doesn’t exist anywhere’, and who 
‘conceive men not as they are, but as they would want them to be’.58 The ‘utopias’ of 
philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, More and Bacon are dismissed in favour 
of a new empirical methodology, following the lessons of ‘statesmen’ who, guided by 
experience (and Spinoza implies Machiavelli and the De la Courts, the few theorists 
referred to positively in the text),59 will aid him ‘to demonstrate the things which agree 
 
54 TP 7.17; Discourses III.24 
55 TP 10.10, echoing Discourses III.24. 
56 Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Peter Bondanella (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), I.3, 
28. 
57 Discourses  ̧chs.III-IV.  
58 TP 1.1; Manzini notes similarities with Aristotle’s Poetics (1460b33-34), wherein Sophocles is said 
to portray people as they ought to be, and Euripides as they are – Spinoza, 1.5.1. 
59 He refers to ‘a very wise Dutchman, V.H.’ in TP 8.31 – V.H. being the initials ‘Van den Hove’, the 
Dutch equivalent of ‘De la Courts’. Machiavelli is referred to in TP 5.7. 
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best with practice, in a certain and indubitable way, and to deduce them from the 
condition of human nature’.60 Politics is no longer concealed beneath biblical analysis 
but is presented as a ‘science’, rooted, like Aristotle, in a theory of the sociality of 
human nature.61 Just as in the Ethics Spinoza considered human nature as if it were ‘of 
lines, planes or bodies’,62 here the affects are a ‘science’ that can be scientifically 
understood with the same ‘freedom of spirit’ as mathematics, so that one can regard 
‘love, hate, anger, envy, love of esteem, compassion, and other emotions’ as properties 
like ‘heat, cold, storms, thunder, etc., pertain to the atmosphere’.63 
This model is probably inspired by Polybius’ understanding of society as an 
equilibrium of forces, an important precursor for Machiavelli, whose models of 
checks, safeguards, and defusing inevitable social conflicts influence Spinoza.64 
Whereas Aristotle, Cicero, and Polybius considered political forms as acting naturally 
towards the teleological good of civil harmony, events in early modern Europe 
presented Machiavelli and Spinoza with case-studies in how societies drift towards 
conflict and war if not sufficiently responsive to popular sovereignty. Yet while 
Machiavelli dismisses utopias to advise would-be princes to ‘learn how not to be 
good’,65 Spinoza takes a separate route, arguing that a well-organised and reasonable 
state requires no such expedient vices.66 What differentiates Spinoza’s TP from its 
peers is its attempt to derive a political naturalism from its own earlier definitions of 
reason, affects and natural right. Leaving nothing to fortuna or the moods of the 
 
60 Ibid., 1.2-4. 
61 TP 1.4. Balibar, Spinoza, 50. 
62 E3Pref. 
63 TP 1.4. 
64 E.g. Discourses, III.11, 286. 
65 Prince, XV, 53. 
66 TP 5.2. 
20 
 
monarch, Spinoza’s rational republic places a commonly-recognised principle of 
popular sovereignty into the very life, and highest good, of political processes.67 
‘Spinozism’, Alquié wrote, ‘although it rejects all subordination of desire for any 
purpose, remains a doctrine of seeking the highest good’.68 There are scattered 
references to a ‘highest good’ or ‘perfect good’ across Spinoza’s works: the free man 
of the Ethics, and the exemplar of the Hebrew Republic under Moses in the TTP, both 
present devices for different audiences aimed at educating our imaginations to what 
else might be possible, and thereby accomplished.69 God is also described as the 
‘exemplar of the true life’ in the TTP, and the early Short Treatise encourages us to 
imagine a ‘perfect man’ to emulate.70 The orientation towards the mind’s freedom in 
the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect is provided by a ‘true good’ that acts as 
a ‘guiding principle’.71 Likewise, the TP sets out to address the ‘highest good’ of the 
state, noted earlier, but also specifically in Chapter 5, which shifts to normative 
considerations. ‘We can know easily what the best condition of each state is from the 
end of the civil condition’, he writes, ‘which is nothing other than peace and security 
of life’.72 Taken in itself, this marks a more cautious climbdown from the TTP’s 
exhortation that the ‘true end of the Republic is really freedom’.73 But the chapter is 
conflicted between a Machiavellian realism that understands politics ‘by right’, and in 
 
67 Cf. Hobbes, On the Citizen, ed. trans. Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), XII.8; Machiavelli, Discourses, IX, 36 
68 Ferdinand Alquié, Leçons sur Spinoza (Paris: La Table ronde, 2003), 313. 
69 E4p67-73, TTP 17. 
70 TTP 13.8, 14.10-11, KV 2.6. 
71 TIE 11. 
72 TP 5.2. 
73 TTP 20.9; cf. Balibar, Spinoza, 51. 
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terms of the capacity, affects and judgement of various actors – or by the ‘best way’,74 
as per Aristotle. Five people may own neighbouring fields of equal size, and each can 
by right choose to sow seasonable or unseasonable crops, or turn it to pasture, or leave 
it fallow. Some may draw on first-hand practical knowledge of growing or the latest 
fertilisers and seeds suited for the soil; others may plant what they judge will yield the 
greatest profit at market, and, fogged by ambition and greed, give little thought to 
whether the site is suitable; others may make little or no effort at all. The best way is 
of a different order, involving that which is most conducive to human flourishing. In a 
remark that echoes Eudemian Ethics on the ‘noble life’, Spinoza argues that the best 
way in politics involves not merely a comfortable animal existence (‘merely the 
circulation of blood’, but passing ‘a human life’ – a rare forceful instance of this word 
– a life ‘mostly by reason, the true virtue and life of the Mind’.75 But, as the preceding 
argument already makes clear, the life of reason cannot fall back on Ciceronian 
platitudes of the inherent harmony or virtue of politics. Drawing on Machiavelli’s 
recognition of the inherently conflictual and dynamic nature of politics, Spinoza’s 
political reason raises its attention to what can best mould and manage the wills of the 
multitude – no longer the persuasive prophets of the TTP, but the virtuous 
administration of the state. 
5. The Virtue of the State 
The TP displays an increased confidence in government and law for realising human 
freedom, one conceived no longer at an individual level, as per the beatitudo of Ethics, 
but on the collective. As Spinoza argues, ‘the path reason teaches us to follow is very 
 
74 TP 5.1. 
75 Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, trans. Anthony Kenny (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), I.2, 
1214b10; cf. Manzini, Spinoza, I.3, comparing Aristotle to TIE 16. 
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difficult’, and so those ‘who persuade themselves that a multitude, which may be 
engaged in public affairs, can be induced to live only according to the prescription of 
reason’ are ‘dreaming of the golden age of the poets’.76 The TP’s goal is to describe 
various optimal forms of political organisation wherein ‘the peace and freedom of its 
citizens is to remain inviolate’.77 If a state is to survive, its ‘affairs must be so ordered 
that, whether the people who administer them are led by reason or by passion, they 
can’t be induced to be disloyal or to act badly’.78 Whether they do or not is a 
consequence of the good organisation of their governmental form. Spinoza adds that 
it ‘doesn’t make a difference … in what spirit men are led to administer matters 
properly’, so long as this instrumental good is achieved. For ‘freedom of mind, or 
strength of character’, Ethics’ highest virtues, are no more than a ‘private virtue’, 
whereas ‘the virtue of the state is security’. Whether individuals are guided by reason 
or passion is irrelevant to the overall freedom that living in a well-organised, secure 
state confers.  
But does this proposal relegate the value of individual freedom or truthfulness 
altogether, and does it constitute a seismic break from the TTP, as Balibar suggests?79 
There is something of Machiavelli’s Prince in the remark, and it jars with the highest 
good of Chapter 5. Its conflicting strands are illuminated by the account of freedom 
and nature that follows it, early in Chapter 2, which render the conceptual necessity 
and consistency of thinking individual freedom through the state. Spinoza begins with 
a recap of the TTP’s theory of natural right, involving a subtle redefinition bearing the 
 
76 TP 1.5. 
77 TP title-page. 
78 TP 1.6. 
79 Balibar also remarks that the works ‘belong to two entirely different worlds’, a view this paper is 
sympathetic to: Spinoza and Politics, 50-51. 
23 
 
influence of the Ethics, where ‘freedom is virtue, or perfection’.80 Against Hobbes, 
there is no ‘freedom’ in the natural state, but only in living in the civil state, where 
together we can offer mutually assistance and live lives of greater well-being and 
peace.81 But what if the state we live in is poorly-constituted and regularly suffers 
crises of sovereignty, like the collapses of Rampjaar?  
One issue facing Spinoza’s endorsement of free speech, toleration and the 
inherent rationality of large, free democratic assemblies in the TTP was the extent to 
which individuals were able to think and speak freely, or under the coercion of another. 
Whereas the Preface of the TTP reflects on how men can be led by their fear to ‘fight 
for servitude as if for salvation’,82 defending the regimes of tyrants who ultimately 
oppress them, the ‘theoretical’ Chapter 16 considers men in nature who will speak and 
deliberate by their own reasonable judgement.83 Contextual matters discussed in Part 
2 necessitate a theoretical explanation as to how the judgement of many can fall under 
the power of one, in ways not just explicable by hope or fear. In his gloss of the TTP’s 
natural right in Chapter 2, Spinoza significantly if subtly redefines the relation of 
freedom to independence of thought.84 He begins by outlining the conatus doctrine, 
before re-formulating desire as a form of consciousness of one’s appetites, wherein a 
desired object’s ‘good’ or ‘evil’ is relative to its empowerment of a person’s specific 
 
80 TP 2.7, echoing E4df8. 
81 TP 2.15. 
82 TTP Pref.10. 
83 Spinoza uses this term to distinguish his preceding theory of natural right and democracy from the 
historical analysis of the Hebrew Republic under Moses that follows it (TTP 17.1). 
84 Spinoza will do the same in his gloss of the Ethics, redefining Adam’s original sin as resulting from 
being subject to affects that prevented him from using his reason (TP 2.6), versus E4p68s, which 
peculiarly explains it through Adam’s imitation of the affects of the animals. 
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nature as they judge it.85 Spinoza then adds a new argument that correlates human 
power with independence of thought. He gives four instances where one person falls 
under the authority of another (sub potestare habere) either in body or mind,86 and to 
the extent that one is deceived by another, one is subject to their right.87 By implication, 
‘it follows that a mind is completely its own master just to the extent that it can use 
reason rightly’. Neither afraid nor deceived, it can think for itself, and since human 
power should be assessed ‘not so much by the strength of the body as by the strength 
of mind’, it follows that ‘people are most their own masters when they can exert the 
most power with their reason’. The argument is made briefly in the manner of a recap, 
but Spinoza expands his theory of power to explicitly involve a greater degree of 
independence and self-control. For one (or many) to possess their own right (sui 
juris),88 they require a relative power of self-determination or autonomy to withstand 
the rights of others who might otherwise seek to exploit them. In concise fashion, 
Spinoza offers a new foundation with which to tackle the problem of political servitude 
introduced in the TTP, through independence of mind.  
From this, Spinoza restates his previous arguments for the possibility and 
advantages of collective power (‘if two men come together…’)89 and mutual 
assistance,90 from which he derives the necessity of acting together – ‘the more they 
agree as one in this way, the more right they will all have together’ – and arrives at his 
first formulation of collective power. While a late addition to Ethics also pointed to 
 
85 TP 2.8. 
86 TP 2.10. 
87 TP 2.11. 
88 Aristotle also limits citizenship to those deemed ‘self-sufficient’ (1275b13). 
89 TP 2.13; cf. E4p18s. 
90 TP 2.15. 
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how, in coming together for a common purpose, men multiply their right (E4p37s2), 
in the TP this language of coordination and collective right is much more prominent. 
In holding their rights in common, ‘all are led as if by one mind’, a power that is also 
greater than the sum of its parts, and foundational to sovereignty in all three state-
forms.91 Such coordination is impossible however unless the state’s laws are 
‘prescribed by reason’, and it is in this way that Spinoza’s civil state is one guided by 
reason, rather than coercive conformity.92  
But what does this reason amount to? For Spinoza, it refers to the common good, 
the freedom that all can collectively share in and benefit from. Thus Spinoza writes 
that the state must be established ‘so that everyone – both those who rule and those 
who are ruled – does what’s for the common well-being’.93 Again, it does not matter 
if this is done willingly, reasonably or not, so long as their common good is realised – 
‘whether of his own accord, or by force, or by necessity’, they will all live ‘according 
to the prescription of reason’. This prescription of reason is what results in the 
flourishing of the people, echoing Cicero and the TTP (16.10). The ‘people’s well-
being [salus populi] is the supreme law, or the king’s highest right’ in a monarchy,94 
and it is an elementary standard of the strength of any given polity in the TP.95  
These, in themselves, are not uncommon in early modern republicanism: what’s 
interesting is how they become interlinked with organicist metaphors of the multitude 
as acting, led or guided ‘as if by one mind’ [una veluti mente] – a phrase that appears 
 
91 TP 2.16; TP 2.17. 
92 TP 2.21; cf. TP 5.4, which makes this clearer. 
93 TP 6.3. 
94 TP 7.5. 
95 Cf. TP 3.17, 4.6, 5.7, 6.3, 6.8, 7.3-5, 8.20, 8.44; cf. Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. J.C.A. Gaskin (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), XXX.1. 
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numerous times, particularly in Chapters 2-3 – and as one body of citizens.96 While on 
an elementary level one can agree with Curley that acting by one mind connotes a 
‘commonality of purpose’, if this were merely Spinoza’s point then such a vivid and 
oft-repeated metaphor would not be expected in an otherwise austere and 
unsentimental writing style. Spinoza’s choice of passive inflections of the verb ducere 
(to lead or guide) instead indicate how a multitude are led and compelled to act in 
common, and in coordination with one another, through a shared set of true ideas. Led 
as one need not imply that such individuals share the same thoughts. Spinoza’s 
physical digression explains how groups of bodies can unite as one and share a 
common ratio among each other, becoming one individual through sharing a common 
order and purpose, while also remaining partially independent and not necessarily 
agreeing in nature.97 The emphasis on reason also accords with Spinoza’s 
epistemology in Ethics, wherein knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily 
a basis of agreement.98 It also draws on the social epistemology of the TTP, for whom 
the truths of ‘true religion’ and prophecy are those which result in behaviours of justice 
and loving-kindness, through being relayed at a suitably imaginative level that can 
stimulate and guide the minds of the many. Within Spinoza’s late politics and its 
blueprints for secure states, the right of a state is the power of a free multitude, led by 
one mind or a common set of laws,99 established in accordance with reason, with the 
end of their common flourishing. 
 
96 Variants appear at TP 2.13, 2.15-16, 2.21, 3.2, 3.5, 3.7, 6.1, and 8.6. Organicist metaphors of the body 
politic are common, appearing prominently in Hobbes, Grotius and, ultimately, Aristotle, e.g. 1281b5, 
1287b30.  
97 E2p13s. 
98 E2p40s, 4p31-p32 and 4p35. 
99 TP 3.2; 2.21, 3.7. 
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The entrance of ‘free multitude’ is also intentional. In TP 5.6 Spinoza compares 
a ‘free multitude’ from a ‘slave’ one, who live in a state gained by right of war. In a 
distinction that echoes the conflict of the free man and slave in Ethics,100 the free 
multitude lives by hope and for life, and live for themselves; in contrast, the subjugated 
multitude live by fear and to avoid death, and for the benefit of the victor. This 
distinction is important, indicating how Spinoza positively draws on the common 
people (multitudo) as the basis of political sovereignty where previous references in 
the TTP and Ethics were often scathing and dismissive. A peaceful and secure 
commonwealth is one where the free multitude are guided to live in accordance with 
reason; a warlike and disorderly one where they are subjugated externally by the right 
of another, and internally by a turmoil of fear, prejudice and hatred. While we can 
agree with Matheron that the multitude are the ‘immanent’ power of a commonwealth, 
there is no inherent rationality or ‘democratic conatus’ in a multitude, who can just as 
easily be led through servility by a tyrant.101  
Thus the distinction drawn between citizens (cives) and subjects (subditos) is 
important: whereas citizens ‘enjoy, by civil right, all the advantages of a 
commonwealth’, the remaining multitudo are merely subjects, ‘bound to obey the 
established practices of the commonwealth, or its laws’,102 an inherently passive state, 
obeying the laws out of fear, not free and willing consent. It is akin to the discussion 
of being ‘subject’ in mind to another’s right earlier. The citizen possesses sui juris 
whereas the subject remains passive and unfree. When Spinoza writes that ‘the right 
 
100 E5p41-42. 
101 Matheron, “The Theoretical Function of Democracy in Spinoza and Hobbes”, The New Spinoza, 
ed. Warren Montag and Ted Stolze (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1997), 217; Negri argues 
similarly in Savage Anomaly, 194-8. 
102 TP 3.1. 
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of a commonwealth is determined by the power of a multitude that is guided as though 
by a single mind’,103 from the preceding discussion we can understand that such a 
freedom or unanimity arises from a life in common that is peaceful and mutually 
supportive, but one also led by the citizens and imposed on subjects.  
Thus the ‘union of minds could in no way be conceived unless the chief aim of 
the commonwealth is identical with that which sound reason teaches us is for the good 
of all men’.104 The virtue of the state is one with the virtue of the individual. The 
conclusion is shared with Aristotle, who asked ‘whether we are to say that happiness 
is the same for the individual human being and for the state, or not’.105 He gives a 
forthright answer, and one which Spinoza might accept: ‘all would agree that it is the 
same’. The reason of the individual, and of the community, are of the same order. The 
‘end of the civil condition’, writes Spinoza, is ‘peace and security of life’, a state of 
‘freedom’, where men ‘pass their lives harmoniously’.106 Yet while the TTP argues 
that the fundamental instruction of true prophetic revelation and scripture is ‘justice 
and loving-kindness’ in our dealings with others, the TP travels further in its vision of 
harmony, of passing a human life, defined by the true virtue and life of the mind. 
Whereas Part 5 of Ethics wrote in similar terms of a freedom that would be enjoyed 
by the philosopher prepared to undergo its difficult and rare path, here Spinoza 
emphasises the role of the state in providing and promoting the peace, security and 
harmony of the multitude, one with ‘laws established with the prescription of 
reason’.107 But if many individuals are guided as if by one mind by the state’s laws, 
 
103 TP 3.7. 
104 Ibid. 
105 1324a5. 
106 TP 5.1, 5.5. 
107 TP 2.21. 
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what is to separate Spinoza’s endorsement of obedience from the monarchies he also 
attacks, which lead subjects like ‘sheep’ and turn them into ‘slaves’?108 What are the 
rights of the individual or community who might find themselves in opposition to the 
laws or decisions of their state? And what precisely is the role of the state in educating 
its members to reason for themselves?  
A call was made for hermeneutic charity earlier. Spinoza does not emphasise the 
good of public education in the ways that contemporaries John Comenius, Bathsua 
Makin or John Locke later would;109 however he viewed a sufficiently free, tolerant 
society in which science and philosophy flourished as achieving comparable effects. 
For Spinoza, following Hobbes, there is a subtle emphasis on citizenship, which may 
conjecturally have necessitated a separate chapter treatment, following the proposed 
chapter on laws. Spinoza writes that ‘Men aren’t born civil; they become civil’, 
echoing Hobbes’ De Cive, that men require ‘training’ for society, albeit based on a 
social contract founded in escaping fear and violence.110 Instead, for Spinoza, human 
beings are the same everywhere, a claim later made in Chapter 7,111 and differences in 
civil behaviours reflect the institutions that determine them to act in a certain way. This 
making of the citizen follows consequentially from the reasonable constitution of the 
state and its laws. Rebellions, violence or disorder are to be attributed ‘not so much to 
the wickedness of the subjects as to the corruption of the state’, a claim originating in 
Machiavelli.112 But the true virtue of the state is in its continual sensitivity and 
 
108 TP 5.4, echoing Politics, 1280a21. 
109 All three emphasise public education for children, with a Baconian interest in pedagogy (Makin for 
educating girls in England, 1673). While Spinoza doesn’t address pedagogy directly, he had worked 
as a tutor (Ep 9), and his later Hebrew Grammar was produced as a teaching guide. 
110 TP 5.2. Hobbes, On the Citizen, I.2; cf. Machiavelli, Discourses, II.29. 
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calibration of its laws, institutions and decision-making to the common feeling of the 
multitude, one that can be responsive, but also prepared to lead, pursuing courses of 
action of longer-term advantage than short-term gain.  
All the same, the unfinished account does not explain how passive subjects 
might, on an epistemic level, become active citizens. Spinoza is non-committal and 
unclear on the generic eligibility for citizenship in democracies, a point Curley also 
considers a ‘serious, and perhaps irremediable flaw’.113 Nor does Spinoza give any 
account of how a given multitude might be educated or enabled to attain citizenship. 
While Hobbes attributed some virtue to the education of citizens, considering them 
‘clean paper’ to be inscribed with civic values,114 Spinoza rests faith in the intrinsic 
rationality of assemblies. In excluding so many, the democratic assemblies would 
likely reproduce a stale social conformity of members that would inhibit the goods of 
deliberative plurality argued in the TTP. In place of large, dynamic assemblies that 
express ideas that ‘no one had ever thought of before’, might arise institutionally 
defensive and aloof cultures whose ‘one mind that might be guided by reason’, is, in 
Sharp’s words, ‘counterfactual’.115 In other words, despite its pressing contextual 
concerns for an elementary peace and safety, Spinoza’s programme of collective 
liberation remains fettered by a paternalistic reliance on wise statesmen who might 
lead, but not necessarily empower, the multitude. 
6. Conclusion 
Spinoza’s late political thought is preoccupied by questions of what constitutes civil 
order and stability. His conclusions suggest it rests on a common set of ideas and 
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affects in a community, a ‘union of minds’ given form and structure by historical 
traditions and culture, but above all, by the reasonable organisation and direction of 
the state. As he remarks later in the TP, ‘the laws are the soul of the state’ (Anima enim 
imperii jura sunt).116 The sentence is unusual for Spinoza, not only in its concision, 
but in the singular appearance of anima (‘soul’) into the text. There is also a peculiar 
dualism at play: in its assignation of the state’s material survival to the ‘soul’ of its 
laws or constitution, it is reminiscent of a multitude being guided ‘by one mind’ earlier. 
How does this square then with the rule of the affects and desire over human affairs 
set out forcefully by the TP earlier? 
In a recent study, Del Lucchese has perceptively observed the influence of the 
imagination in both phrases.117 A mind imagines that it guides the body, just as a 
community imagines itself to be guided by a common set of ideas or values. We can 
extend that observation to citizens who imagine that the survival of their state rests on 
a reasonable and fair constitution and laws. This should make them more receptive to 
the lessons of political experience, and their underlying theoretical principles in human 
nature, affects and sociality, of Spinoza’s late political science. For laws are only as 
powerful as the utility of obeying them. So long as this constitution or set of laws is 
correctly established and kept ‘inviolate’, then the state can exist in eternal security. 
Such inviolability is dependent on the collective attachment of a people to the civil 
order, which in turn is based on a constitution operating according to reason. The laws 
cannot remain intact unless they are ‘defended both by reason and by the common 
affect of men’. Without this common affect, those laws that rest ‘only on the support 
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of reason’ are ‘weak and easily overcome’.118 Benign dictatorships will collapse unless 
they are founded in the collective feeling or desire of the people, one unlikely to 
tolerate long what does not accomplish the common good. It is the political import of 
this common feeling, decisive for statecraft, that Spinoza’s late politics takes a final, 
incomplete journey towards. While Spinoza’s account remains incomplete and unable 
to supply a model of how passive subjects can become active citizens, its vision of the 
state as the basis for human freedom goes further than either the statesmen or 
contemporaries he used as his guides. 
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